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Abstract—Recent literature suggests that the Internet of Things
(IoT) scales much better in an Information-Centric Networking
(ICN) model instead of the current host-centric Internet Protocol
(IP) model. In particular, the Named Data Networking (NDN)
project (one of the ICN architecture flavors) offers features
exploitable by IoT applications, such as stateful forwarding, in-
network caching, and built-in assurance of data provenance.
Though NDN-based IoT frameworks have been proposed, none
have adequately and holistically addressed concerns related
to secure onboarding and routing. Additionally, emerging IoT
applications such as smart cities require high scalability and thus
pose new challenges to NDN routing. Therefore, in this work, we
propose and evaluate a novel, scalable framework for lightweight
authentication and hierarchical routing in the NDN IoT (ND-
NoT). Our ns-3 based simulation analyses demonstrate that
our framework is scalable and efficient. It supports deployment
densities as high as 40,000 nodes/km2 with an average onboarding
convergence time of around 250 seconds and overhead of less than
20 KiB per node. This demonstrates its efficacy for emerging
large-scale IoT applications such as smart cities.
Keywords: ICN, IoT, secure onboarding, secure routing, net-
working, smart cities.
I. INTRODUCTION
The new emerging concept of smart cities applies concepts
from the Internet of Things (IoT) to the management of
diverse municipal infrastructure and assets [1]. Smart cities
will involve large numbers of IoT devices installed in a range
of settings from individual homes to critical infrastructure,
potentially in a very dense deployment. As a result, their
feasibility will require advances in efficiency and scalability
of IoT communications. Additionally, smart cities will require
strong guarantees of security: networked devices will handle
large volumes of sensitive information and control valuable
assets such as utility infrastructure, thus widening the attack
surface for potential compromise. Thus, strong end-to-end
security and privacy mechanisms between smart devices and
the cloud are imperative.
Recent literature suggests that Information-Centric Network-
ing (ICN) is a more appropriate approach than Internet Protocol
(IP) for IoT [2]. Named Data Networking (NDN) [3], in
particular, is a strong architecture for creating scalable and
efficient smart city networks, by employing features such as
stateful forwarding and in-network caching. In addition, it
offers security benefits such as enforced provenance through
mandatory network-layer signatures.
This work is supported in part by the U.S. NSF grants:1345232 and
1248109 and the U.S. DoD/ARO grant: W911NF-07-2-0027. Paper currently
in submission in IEEE IoT Journal.
Several ICN-based IoT deployments have been announced
in the literature, however no holistic NDN of Things (NDNoT)
architecture and protocol suite has yet been proposed. In
particular, existing literature tends to neglect concerns related
to secure routing and onboarding, two of the most difficult
problems in IoT. Works that do address routing or onboarding
do so separately, neglecting the fact that they are closely
coupled. As a result, the proposed disjoint schemes are
either incompatible or inefficient when combined. Therefore,
we propose in this paper a scalable and secure framework
addressing both onboarding and routing in the NDNoT.
The scalability of an IoT deployment is adversely affected
by the low computational and memory capacities of IoT
devices, as well as the characteristics of the low power
lossy networks (LLNs) they use to communicate. Thus, we
employ a hierarchical network structure, a design which has
been recommended to achieve scalability in IoT [4]. Such an
architecture allows us to offload the burden of routing onto a
few less-constrained “anchor” nodes, while other devices need
only form destination-oriented trees.
In our framework, secure onboarding is made a prerequisite
to routing, in order to help protect the network against routing
attacks such as blackholes [5]. Each node in the network
is authenticated prior to commencing routing, and in turn
a node also authenticates the network it is joining. Since
asymmetric cryptography is typically infeasible on IoT devices,
we use symmetric cryptography. Our onboarding protocol is
based on pre-shared keys between each node and a designated
authentication manager in the infrastructure.
We have combined our approaches to routing and onboarding
into a single holistic framework for Lightweight Authentication
& Secured Routing (LASeR). The combined authentication
and onboarding processes are very lightweight, requiring only
three round trips and few cryptographic operations.
In summary, the contributions of our work are: (1) We
analyze the current state-of-the-art of routing and authentication
in the NDNoT; (2) We propose LASeR, a holistic framework
for efficient and secure onboarding and routing in NDN; and (3)
We demonstrate LASeR’s effectiveness and efficiency through
analyses conducted in ndnSIM, the NDN module for ns-3.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II reviews prior work on NDN and IoT; Section III presents
our model for the IoT network and reviews the primitives
employed by NDN; Section IV describes the cryptographic
materials and operations underlying LASeR’s authentication
mechanism; Section V presents the protocols employed for
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onboarding and routing; Section VI offers a simulation-based
validation of LASeR’s effectiveness; and finally, Section VII
concludes the paper and gives an overview of our planned
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Benefits and challenges related to the ICN-based IoT have
been previously discussed in the literature [2, 6, 7], and several
architectures have been proposed for both general IoT [2] and
specific applications [8–10]. However, the majority of these
designs focus on service discovery, data delivery, and similar
application-centric concerns rather than the initial network
bootstrapping or route discovery procedures and their security.
Though most of the aforementioned works do not suggest
novel routing protocols for IoT, [2] recognized the routing-
related challenges imposed by device constraints in the IoT and
proposed a new opportunistic-reactive routing protocol. Under
this model, forwarding tables are populated after observing the
origins of downstream packets; a flooding-based approach is
used as a fallback when no proper route is available. A similar
approach was previously outlined in [11].
Other approaches to ad-hoc routing in NDN were reviewed
in [12]; the authors identified two broad classes of routing
protocols: provider-blind and provider-aware. The provider-
blind schemes solely employ controlled flooding to forward
requests, while provider-aware schemes add a reactive mecha-
nism like that in the two designs mentioned above. All these
routing protocols employ reactive designs; however, we choose
a proactive approach like that of the IPv6 Routing Protocol for
Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) [13], which is currently
favored for the IP-based IoT.
Bootstrapping and onboarding for the ICN-based IoT have
only recently been given serious consideration. Previous archi-
tectures such as [10] relied on the asymmetric authentication
mechanisms used throughout the NDN stack, however [14]
quantified the time and energy overheads of such schemes
on constrained devices and ultimately concluded that their
cost is too high. As a result, two designs based on symmetric
cryptography were proposed in [15]: a basic implementation
of the authenticated key exchange protocol (AKEP2) [16] over
ICN, and an improved version which increases its efficiency.
Though [15] efficiently addresses the initial authentication
and key-distribution challenges for IoT, it does so without
regard to the needs of a routing protocol. As a result, to employ
it in conjunction with a separate routing framework would
impose additional overhead; the two steps of authentication and
routing will occur serially, increasing overhead in the network
and overall onboarding latency. In light of this, we propose
LASeR, wherein elements of authentication and routing can
occur simultaneously to reduce their overall cost.
III. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we present the system, network, and threat
models and assumptions. For better understanding of our
models and assumptions, we start with an overview of NDN.
A. Overview of NDN
The “thin waist” of the Named Data Networking (NDN)
stack, as the name implies, is Named Data. In the NDN model,
each chunk of data (typically referred to as a content object)
has a unique Name, similar to a Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI); the content associated with each Name is typically
considered to be immutable. To retrieve a particular content
object, a requester sends an Interest packet into the network.
At a minimum, the Interest contains the Name of the desired
content object; it can also contain a signature to verify the
requester’s identity. The network then retrieves the appropriate
content object and delivers it to the requester as a Data packet.
The Data contains, at a minimum, its Name, the actual content
payload, and its publisher’s signature. The requester can then
verify the signature to ascertain the content object’s authenticity.
Both Interest and Data signatures typically (but optionally)
include a KeyLocator field, which contains the Name of the
key used for the signature.
Each router in NDN maintains three data structures: a
Pending Interest Table (PIT), a Forwarding Information Base
(FIB), and a Content Store (CS). The forwarding procedures
for both Interests and Data are based around these tables. Upon
receiving an Interest, a router first checks its CS for a match;
the CS essentially serves as a cache of Data, indexed by Name.
If a match is found in the CS, the Data is served and the
request is considered satisfied. If no match is found in the
CS, the router then checks its PIT, which indicates whether a
previous Interest for the same Name has been forwarded but
not yet satisfied.
If a PIT entry exists, the router need not forward the Interest
again; instead, it adds the identifier of the incoming interface
(Face, in the NDN nomenclature) to that PIT entry. If no
PIT entry is found, the router consults its FIB (essentially
a forwarding table) and employs a configurable forwarding
strategy to identify the correct Face on which to forward the
Interest. The router then adds a new PIT entry indicate that
the Interest was forwarded.
Data packets are essentially forwarded following the reverse
path as indicated by matching PIT entries. That is, a router
receiving a Data checks its PIT to determine the correct Face(s)
on which to forward the Data. Once the Data is forwarded, the
PIT entry is cleared. The Data may then be added to the CS
and used to satisfy future requests, depending on the policy
employed for cache admission and eviction.
Note that the configurability of the forwarding strategy is
an important feature for the application of NDN in IoT. A
different strategy can be employed for each Interest depending
on its Name prefix, allowing, for example, enhanced Quality
of Service (QoS) depending on the nature of the request.
In LASeR, we employ a custom strategy to facilitate our
hierarchical network design; more details on this strategy are
given in Section V-E3.
B. System Model and Assumptions
We model the NDNoT as consisting of islands, which exist
at the edge of the greater Internet. The protocols employed
within the island need not be influenced by those used in the
WAN
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Fig. 1. In our hierarchical island, a gateway connects to the WAN, anchors
form an island backbone, and standard nodes form trees rooted at the anchors.
wide-area network (WAN); therefore, this model is suitable for
a local clean-slate deployment of NDN in smart cities prior to
wide adoption.
We distinguish between three types of nodes within each
island: gateways, anchor nodes (ANs), and standard nodes
(SNs). We assume that SNs have small memory, computation,
and energy capacities, and employ LLN radios; on the other
hand, gateways and ANs are essentially unconstrained. The
connections between these entities are visualized in Fig. 1.
Gateways serve as edge routers between the island and the
WAN, and the ANs are a superset of the gateways and form a
backbone or core for the island. Standard nodes wirelessly peer
with ANs and use them as sinks to facilitate communication,
thus creating trees, or clusters, of constituent SNs around each
AN.
We assume each SN is assigned a flat identifier (ID), which
could either be derived from its media access control (MAC)
address or be chosen arbitrarily. For scalability, we will use
these IDs to perform routing and forwarding. Nodes can also
advertise arbitrary, application-specific Name prefixes; other
requesters would then resolve these Names into IDs for the
purpose of routing. Namespace creation and management is
an NDN- and application-specific decision. This is outside the
scope of this work.
In addition to network entities named above, we assume that
there is a service capable of managing the authentication and
registration of nodes in the network. We will refer to this entity
as the Island Manager (IM); it may exist either in the cloud,
within some particular node, or even as a synchronized database
shared between anchors. We assume that the IM and ANs are
synchronized to perform secure communication and routing.
We do not discuss mechanisms to achieve this, however it is
easy to design and implement. The placement of the IM is an
implementation detail which should be made with consideration
to the specific needs of a particular deployment. The IM will
be responsible for node authentication, and will also serve
Name-to-ID resolution requests to support hierarchical routing.
PINSN IDSN
PBKDF2
PBKDF2
AKSN KDKSN RSN || RIM
TAKSN TEKSN
Fig. 2. LASeR’s key derivations are based around a pre-shared key, PINSN.
Two permanent keys are shared, and two transient keys are derived per session.
C. Threat Model and Assumptions
We assume that all the devices in the network are capable
of performing symmetric key cryptography, such as advanced
encryption standard (AES), and message authentication using
keyed-hashed functions, such as hashed-MAC. As is standard,
we assume that the encryption algorithms and the MAC
functions cannot be compromised. In our system, there can be
both inside and outside attackers. An outside attacker is not
part of the network. It can passively capture data transmissions
in the network to perform traffic analysis and also replay
captured packets. It can also be an active attacker attempting to
masquerade as a legitimate node, and can try to inject false data
into the network. An inside attacker is a node that is already
on-boarded into the network, it can also inject false data in the
network. The false data can include fake route advertisements,
enabling sinkhole or blackhole attacks. A compromised or
colluding node’s keying materials can be extracted and used
by an adversary, not part of the system, to impersonate as a
legitimate node. This is termed sybil attack; the compromised
adversary can operate as a legitimate node in the network.
Denial of service and channel jamming can also be threats in
our system.
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIALS AND PRIMITIVES
A. Overview
The key hierarchy of LASeR, visualized in Fig. 2, is inspired
by that of the Pre-Shared Key Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP-PSK) [17]. A session between an SN and an IM
is identified by the respective IDs of the two parties as well as
two nonces (one chosen by each). The SN and IM initially share
a pre-shared key (PSK), from which two long-lived keys are
derived (one for key derivation, one for authentication). With
the exchange of nonces and establishment of a session, two
additional transient keys are established (one for encryption, one
for authentication). These transient keys can be intermittently
refreshed simply by exchanging new nonces.
Fig. 3. LASeR consists of three phases, each involving one round-trip to the
IM. The discovery phase can be iterated to obtain a desirable path.
B. Permanent Materials
Each SN is required to store at least two permanent pieces
of information: its ID (IDSN) and its PSK (PINSN), which could
be installed at the time of manufacture. The IM is required to
permanently store only its own ID (IDIM). The IDs may be
arbitrary, and the PSK should be random.
C. Long-Lived Keys
As in EAP-PSK, we use a PSK (in this case, PINSN)
in order to derive two long-lived keys: the Authentication
Key (AKSN), and the Key-Derivation Key (KDKSN). For ease
of implementation, we use a password-based key derivation
function (PBKDF2) [18], rather than the modified counter mode
block cipher used by EAP-PSK, to derive these keys from the
PSK. Following the construction in EAP-PSK, we configure
PBKDF2 with the following options: PINSN as the password,
IDSN as the salt, and an output length of 256 bits. The first
128 bits of output shall be used as AKSN, and the last 128
bits as KDKSN. We use HMAC-SHA256 as the pseudorandom
function behind PBKDF2, due to its wide use and ease of
implementation.
The SN may optionally pre-generate and cache both AKSN
and KDKSN permanently, though it is not required to. The
IM cannot generate these keys until binding time, as it may
not have prior knowledge of IDSN. To enable use of NDN’s
in-stack authentication features, AKSN should be registered on
both nodes as /keys/<IDSN>/AK, and KDKSN registered as
/keys/<IDSN>/KDK.
D. Transient Keys
To enhance security, the static keys derived directly from
the PSK are not used to transmit application data, but only
to bootstrap the authentication process. As in EAP-PSK, two
nonce-based ephemeral keys will be derived from the key-
derivation key. In particular, KDKSN is used to derive two
transient keys: a Transient Authentication Key (TAKSN), and a
Transient Encryption Key (TEKSN). Again, we use PBKDF2
with HMAC-SHA256 to derive 256 bits of keying material.
The key KDKSN is used as the password, and a pair of
nonces (RSN and RIM) established during the handshake is
used as the salt (details in Section V). These keys are also
registered within the local NFD for ease of use: TAKSN
is registered as /keys/<IDSN>/<RSN>/<RIM>/TAK, and
TEKSN as /keys/<IDSN>/<RSN>/<RIM>/TEK.
E. Secure Channel
Once TAKSN and TEKSN are derived, a secure channel
can be established. Messages are encrypted with AES128-
CBC under TEKSN, while TAKSN is used for HMAC-SHA256
signing. These keys are used to deliver an additional symmetric
key to used for route advertisement, namely the Routing
Authentication Key (RAK).
In the following sections, we use the notation [ ... ]K
to indicate that a message is signed under the key K, and
{ ... }K to indicate that a message is encrypted under K.
V. THE LASER PROTOCOL
A. Overview
Onboarding and routing using LASeR occurs in three steps,
depicted in Fig. 3: (1) network discovery and authentication, (2)
SN authentication and key delivery, and (3) path advertisement.
In the first phase, an SN discovers an already-onboarded
neighbor, who then asks the IM for the information necessary
to authenticate the network to the new SN. In the second phase,
the SN authenticates itself to the IM and acquires the keys
necessary to advertise a route. The final phase consists solely
of the SN advertising its route; the route is then propagated
hop-by-hop toward the anchor using SetNext messages. The
anchor then notifies the IM of the SN’s registration using a
SetPrefix message. The full process can be performed in as
little as three round trips between a joining SN and the IM.
The resulting routes from SNs to ANs are similar to those
which would be obtained by a scheme based on destination-
oriented directed acyclic graphs (DODAGs) such as RPL [13].
However, each node chooses only one upstream path in LASeR
and therefore the result is a forest of trees, each rooted at an AN
(equivalent to sinks in RPL nomenclature). Routing between
anchors and gateways is assumed to be handled by other means,
e.g. a link-state protocol, and is beyond the scope of this work.
B. Network Discovery and Authentication
The first stage of LASeR is network discovery and au-
thentication; that is, an SN discovers a path and verifies the
legitimacy of the network it is connecting to. It involves three
network entities: the node joining the island (SN2), its neighbor
(SN1), and the island manager (IM). The discovery process
may begin either when SN2 first comes online, or at a later
time when it receives a wakeup beacon (a notification from
a newly-onboarded neighbor that a path to an AN is now
available). The complete discovery protocol is presented in
Fig. 4.
The first transmission in this phase is a Discovery Request
sent by SN2, which constitutes a request to join an island. This
transmission is an Interest under the /discover/ prefix,
which is assumed to be broadcast-forwarded in order for SN2
to identify an immediate neighbor. The Interest should have a
relatively long PIT lifetime (likely on the order of minutes),
Fig. 4. The first phase of LASeR involves SN2 discovering a network through its neighbor SN1. The IM authenticates the network to SN2 using its knowledge
of PINSN2 . The AN (indicated by dotted line) is not involved in the protocol, however messages between SN1 and IM will pass through it en route.
as it may require human input at the IM (to enter PINSN2 , if it
is not pre-shared) before a Data can be sent in response.
This initial Interest sent by SN2 contains its ID (IDSN2 ),
a self-generated nonce (RSN2 ), and its current hop-distance
from an anchor (ADSN2 , initially ∞); the complete name
is /discover/<IDSN2>/<RSN2>/<ADSN2>. Any neighbor
(SN1) which receives this message, is fewer than ADSN2−1
hops from an anchor, and wishes to serve as a relay
for SN2 shall relay it to its AN along with its own
MAC (MACSN1 ), its hop-count distance from an anchor
(ADSN1 ), and the ID of that anchor (IDAN). This mes-
sage, an Onboarding Request, essentially represents SN1’s
assent to providing a route towards AN for SN2. To this
end, SN1 constructs a new Interest for /<IDIM>/onboard
/<IDSN2>/<RSN2>/<MACSN1>/<ADSN1>/<IDAN> and signs
it under RAKAN (which is shared by all successfully-onboarded
nodes under the AN, as well as by the IM).
Upon receiving this Interest, the IM derives AKSN2 and
KDKSN2 according to the procedure outlined in Section IV-C.
It generates its nonce RIM and replies with a Network Authenti-
cation (NA) message, which is a Data containing IDSN2 , RSN2 ,
IDIM, RIM, MACSN1 , ADSN1 , and IDAN. The Data is signed
under AKSN2 . This Data authenticates IM to SN2, informs it
of its next-hop neighbor (SN1), its distance from an anchor
(ADSN1 + 1), and its anchor (AN). Because SN1 changed
the Interest name in-flight, it must perform the corresponding
reverse mapping in order to deliver the message to SN2; i.e.,
the application layer changes the Data’s Name from that in the
Onboarding Request to that in the original Discovery Request.
After obtaining this Data, SN2 may send a new discover
Interest in order to attempt to locate a shorter path to an anchor
(in the context of our example, a different node would then
take on the role of SN1). To do so, it sends the same Interest
as previously but with a new nonce and an updated AD field.
This process may be iterated as many times as desired, or until
Fig. 5. In the second stage of LASeR, SN2 authenticates itself to the IM
and obtains the RAK corresponding to its anchor.
SN2 no longer receives a useful response.
When SN2 is content with its path, it notes its next hop
toward the anchor as IDSN1 and its anchor as IDAN, then
proceeds to phase two as follows.
C. SN Authentication and Key Delivery
After completing the first phase, SN2 trusts its island (via
its trust for the IM) and is capable of forwarding Interests to
any entity within. However, the island does not yet trust SN2.
In order to establish this trust, SN2 begins the second phase,
which is illustrated in Fig. 5. This phase begins with SN2
sending its SN Authentication (SA), a signed Interest to IM
containing the previously exchanged nonces, RSN2 and RIM, as
well as IDSN2 , IDAN, and IDIM. This Interest is to be routed
using the next-hop information ascertained in the first phase.
The IM, upon receiving the Interest, verifies the signature and
content and produces a Data packet containing the anchor-
specific RAKAN (shared secrets between IM and ANs are
always synchronized). The key is encrypted under TEKSN2 and
signed under TAKSN2 . At this point, SN2 is authenticated and
can move into the third phase to advertise its path.
D. Path Advertisement
All information necessary for SN2 to route Interests to other
nodes in the island was acquired in the first phase; however, no
node is yet able to route interests to SN2. In order for Interests
to be delivered to SN2, each node on the path between SN2
and AN must know the next hop toward SN2. To update this
routing state, SN2 sends a notification called a SetNext message
upstream, signed under RAKAN.
To keep track of downstream nodes, each SN and AN
maintains a Downstream Forwarding Base (DFB), which maps
a node ID to the next-hop MAC address. The strategy layer
of each node uses the DFB and the FIB to make forwarding
decisions regarding Interests with destinations in the same
AN’s cluster.
To inform the next-hop node of its location, SN2 creates
the SetNext Interest with its neighbor’s prefix (IDSN1 ) and the
command /set-next, followed by its own ID (IDSN2 ) and
the MAC address of SN1’s next-hop toward it (in this case,
MACSN2 ). This Interest is signed with RAKAN. SN1 receives
this interest, updates its DFB, then constructs a similar Interest
informing the next upstream node that it is the next-hop to
reach SN2. This process, illustrated in Fig. 6, continues until
the packet reaches the AN.
Fig. 6. In the final stage of LASeR, SN2 notifies its neighbor SN1 of its commitment to its path. SN1 then sends a similar notification to the next hop; this
repeats until AN learns a route to SN2. Then, AN informs IM that it is serving as the anchor for SN2. Note that the IM may be co-located with the AN.
When the AN receives this Interest, it updates its DFB and
sends a SetPrefix notification to the IM to record that it serves
as SN2’s anchor. This allows the IM to serve name resolution
requests for SN2. The IM responds with a simple ACK message,
which should be forwarded hop-by-hop to satisfy the PIT entries
for these Interests, and ultimately notify SN2 that it has been
successfully onboarded.
Upon receiving the ACK, SN2 may send a wakeup Interest
(Name /wakeup) to notify nearby nodes that it has been
onboarded and can now facilitate their onboarding. This
procedure can help expedite the initial onboarding process
for an island.
E. Additional Considerations
The above protocols accomplish secure onboarding and
routing. In what follows, we will discuss some additional
maintenance procedures in LASeR, such as key refresh, prefix
resolution, and routing between ANs.
1) Key Refresh: Both the SN’s session keys and the AN’s
RAK may need to be periodically refreshed in order to maintain
the security of the island. When the SN wants to change
keys, it can either restart from the discovery process, or
contact the IM directly to exchange new nonces. In the latter
case, the same authentication procedure applies. In order to
refresh RAKAN, the IM should generate the new key and send
[{<RAKAN>}TEKi]TAKi to each node i in the AN’s cluster, as
well as the AN itself.
2) Prefix Resolution: To enable hierarchical forwarding
based on ANs, after committing to a path, an SN assumes
a new name-prefix rooted under its AN. This prefix is
communicated to the IM at the end of the path-advertisement
protocol (Section V-D). The IM stores a mapping of IDs
to prefixes, and can respond to Interests querying for the
prefixes of registered nodes (e.g., respond to an Interest
/<IDIM>/get-prefix/<IDSN>). Similarly, the SNs and
the ANs need to be able to remap Interests onto the appropriate
prefixes. Additional arbitrary Name prefixes that a node wishes
to serve should also be communicated to the IM. The IM also
resolves requests for these arbitrary Names into routable Names,
constructed from the corresponding IDs and AN prefixes. The
processes for name registration and resolution are quite simple
and can be done in various ways. Due to space constraints this
discussion is omitted in this paper.
3) Routing Within and Between Clusters: In LASeR, anchors
obtain routes to each other out-of-band, for example using
a link-state algorithm such as NLSR [19]. By virtue of
hierarchical naming and prefix-based forwarding, anchors need
not advertise the constituent nodes in their clusters, only their
own prefixes. We assume that the gateway is also a member
of this link-state session, and therefore any standard node can
reach the gateway just as easily as it can reach an anchor.
In order to reach a node within the same cluster, forwarding
nodes use their DFBs. However, each node only has DFB
entries for those nodes that rely on it for a path to the anchor.
Therefore, in our framework nodes route toward the anchor by
default if the DFB lookup fails. As a result, packets between
nodes in the same cluster (e.g., machine-to-machine flows)
climb the tree toward the AN until the first common ancestor
is reached; the packet is then forwarded down the tree to the
destination.
To reach a node in another cluster, the IM must first
be queried to obtain the node’s prefix, as mentioned in
Section V-E2 (Prefix Resolution). This operation can be made
transparent to applications by performing it in the strategy
layer, and the prefix returned by the IM can be cached to
reduce latency for future requests.
F. Security Analyses
The goal of LASeR is to secure routing in a smart city IoT
network. Therefore, we focus on analyzing concerns related to
the authenticity and provenance of obtained routes. We will
also remark on privacy concerns where applicable.
The authentication and key exchange procedures in LASeR
are effectively equivalent to those of EAP-PSK and AKEP2,
which have been proven in literature to be secure. However, the
use of a shared RAK for securing routing messages between
nodes in a cluster is a potential vulnerability. Though the RAK
is always transmitted in an encrypted form, its compromise
(through brute force or node takeover) would allow an attacker
to publish fake routes on behalf of any node in the compromised
cluster.
The result of such an attack would essentially be denial
of service of requests destined to that node (assuming the
flow’s own data is authenticated). This attack can cause
blackhole, sinkhole, or wormhole attacks. The LASeR protocol
could be augmented to report any changes in the topology
to the IM, giving it complete knowledge of the network.
Sophisticated algorithms for detecting blackholes, sinkholes,
or wormholes can then be employed at the IM. Once detected,
the compromised SNs can be revoked and the RAK can be
securely refreshed for the remaining legitimate SNs.
In many IoT onboarding protocols, the compromise of an
already-trusted node can have major impacts. In LASeR, this
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Fig. 7. Simulation results for the four scenarios with increasing deployment density within a 50× 50 meter area.
would result only in the attacker gaining knowledge of the
RAK and the node’s own PSK, which it can use to inject fake
routes as described above; any application-specific information
obtained would not impact routing security. If the node is
identified, its PSK can be de-authenticated by the IM and
the RAK refreshed as usual. Any unencrypted data (such as
IDs) collected by the compromised node do not undermine the
security of the network; however, they may be used for traffic
analysis and privacy attacks. Ephemeral IDs and pseudonyms
can be used to prevent such information leakage.
Some information about the network topology is leaked
by LASeR—a passive attacker could determine the layout
of the network by observing Onboarding Request packets en
route to the IM. Though we have chosen not to prioritize the
protection of this information, the Onboarding Request and
its reply could easily be encrypted under an additional key
derived from the KDK. Similarly, the RAK can be augmented
with an additional key to enable the encryption of SetNext and
SetPrefix messages. Node anonymity can also be compromised
by observing IDs in transmission; however, because we allow
IDs to be chosen arbitrarily they can be made ephemeral to
thwart related attacks.
Channel jamming and other link-layer or physical-layer
denial-of-service attacks are beyond the scope of our frame-
work.
VI. SIMULATION EVALUATION
A. Scenario Configuration
Our initial validation of LASeR was done in ndnSIM [20],
an ns-3 extension implementing NDN. The implementation
of LASeR involves an application-level controller, a custom
forwarding strategy, a modified PIT, and a modified Face which
supports ad-hoc forwarding. We have also implemented a hop-
by-hop fragmentation and reassembly protocol similar to that
in NDNLP [21].
We used the LrWpanNetDevice to model 802.15.4 radios
with slotted CSMA/CA, with the Log Distance Propagation
Loss and Constant Speed Propagation Delay models to simulate
the radio channel. Unfortunately, the practicality of executing
large-scale wireless scenarios in ns-3 is limited (as interference
calculations become prohibitively expensive), so we focus on
a cluster of SNs around a single AN in each experiment. The
cluster forms the building block of any IoT network, which is
essentially composed of several such clusters. Onboarding in
a single cluster is representative of that in all clusters, as they
can happen in parallel. Therefore, we have not modeled the
interconnections between anchors, nor a gateway to a WAN,
and we assume that each anchor is capable of acting on behalf
of the IM. We do not implement the IM’s prefix resolution
service for this validation study.
In our evaluations, we explore two settings: increasing
density of nodes within a fixed area, and decreasing density of
a fixed number of nodes. Two sets of scenarios were created
for these two settings; they will be detailed in their respective
subsections. For each scenario, we will explore four statistics:
time for onboarding convergence, the transmission burden
of each node, the size of each node’s subtree, and the hop-
count distances between nodes and their anchors. Convergence
times and hop counts serve as indicators of scalability, while
transmission burdens and subtree sizes correspond to the energy
efficiency of the protocol.
B. Increasing Density
To study the effects of increasing node density, we created
scenarios wherein varying numbers of SNs are placed uniformly
at random in a 50× 50 m2 (0.0025 km2), and a single AN is
placed at the center. We evaluated scenarios of 40 nodes, 60
nodes, 80 nodes, and 100 nodes; this corresponds to densities
ranging from 16, 000 to 40, 000 nodes/km2. For each scenario,
we averaged results over 20 runs with different pseudo-random
number generator (PRNG) seeds; note that the seed affects
both node placement and network behavior. To simulate real-
world deployments the SNs power-on at random times in the
network. The time follows an exponential distribution with
λ−1 = 120 seconds (2 minutes). An SN attempts to join the
network after it is powered-on.
1) Convergence Time: Fig. 7(a) depicts the empirical cumu-
lative distribution functions (eCDFs) of network convergence
times; the X-axis represents time, while the Y-axis gives the
cumulative proportion of nodes that have been onboarded. As
SNs power on randomly, we identified that congestion is not a
big challenge to onboarding–new nodes get onboarded rapidly.
No clear trend can be seen between the 40, 60, and 80 node
scenarios. However, the 100-node scenario clearly converges
slower, suggesting that as density increases, radio interference
has increasingly adverse impact on onboarding. We believe
that with greater densities, onboarding may not converge. The
worst-case convergence time across all runs was 314.6 seconds
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Fig. 8. Simulation results for the four scenarios of 100 nodes with increasing deployment area.
(5 minutes, 14.6 seconds), not much longer than the average
case for 100 nodes, 271.0 seconds (4 minutes, 31.0 seconds).
We believe this to be an acceptable convergence delay, as the
process only occurs once.
2) Transmission Burden: The amount of energy consumed
by a node is dominated by wireless transmissions. In LASeR,
the transmission burden of an SN grows as it serves increasing
number of other SNs as a forwarder in the onboarding process.
Therefore, we evaluate the transmission burden observed for
SNs of varying subtree sizes. Application-introduced bandwidth
is not considered here; only LASeR traffic is measured. Anchor
nodes are not included in this analysis, as we assume they are
not subject to power constraints.
Fig. 7(b) summarizes our analysis of this transmission burden
under increasing subtree size and network node density; subtree
sizes are on the X-axis, and total KiB transmitted is on the Y-
axis. A clear linear trend is visible under increasing subtree size;
as expected, transmission burden is approximately proportional
to the number of nodes being served in the subtree. Additionally,
notice that increasing node density results in overall larger
transmission burdens, a pattern resulting from interference-
related retransmissions.
In our simulations, a single node must transmit an average
of 9.89 kibibytes (KiB) throughout the onboarding process;
while this is a reasonable burden, we notice that this burden
is compounded by increasing the number of downstream SNs.
For this reason, care must be taken to avoid creating large
subtrees in a real IoT deployment.
3) Subtree Size and Distance from Anchor: Fig. 7(c) depicts
the empirical probabilities of each observed subtree size; the
X-axis gives subtree sizes, and the Y-axis gives the likelihood
that a node would host a subtree of that size. On average,
83.6% of nodes served no children, and thus would experience
the minimum transmission burden. In accordance with intuition,
hop-count distance from an anchor was correlated to subtree
size; on average, 79.2% of nodes were only one hop away
from the anchor. However, we observed that increasing node
density increased the average subtree size and path length,
even though the nodes’ physical distances from the anchor
were unchanged. This is because increased density increases
interference, thus reducing the effective transmission range of
nodes and increasing the chance of SNs to use intermediate
forwarders to reach the AN.
C. Increasing Distance
In the previous subsection, we focused on increasing the
number of nodes deployed in a fixed 50×50 m2 area. We now
evaluate a second set of scenarios, wherein the node count is
fixed at 100 and the deployment area is varied. This increases
sparseness, causing creation of longer paths from SNs to the
AN and bigger subtrees. We chose areas of 50×50 m2 (0.0025
km2), 100 × 100 m2 (0.01 km2), 200 × 200 m2 (0.04 km2),
and 400×400 m2 (0.16 km2). Again, results are averaged over
20 runs. The time at which nodes come online is exponential
with λ−1 = 120 seconds. With a few exceptions, trends are
similar to those observed in the fixed-area scenario set.
1) Convergence Time: The convergence times under the
100-node scenarios are visualized as eCDFs in Fig. 8(a). We
again see that the densest scenario reaches final convergence
slowest, however it is notable that the sparsest scenario (0.16
km2) has a slower initial progression. An inflection point is
visible between 100-120 seconds, suggesting that connectivity
is poor prior to a sufficient number of nodes (which will serve
as intermediate forwarders) being onboarded.
2) Transmission Burden: The transmission burdens for
nodes with each observed subtree size are visualized in Fig. 8(b).
Again, there is a clear trend of increased burden under higher
densities, when considering similarly-sized subtrees; this is
due to interference-related retransmissions. However, we can
see that in the sparsest scenario, some nodes host much larger
subtrees and thus carry a greater burden. The available energy
at these nodes serves as the bottleneck for communication
from the downstream nodes. Thus, care must be taken in node
placement: nodes’ distances from anchors should be minimized.
3) Subtree Size and Distance from Anchor: The observed
probability mass function of subtree sizes is given in Fig. 8(c).
Again, a majority of nodes host no children; however, in the
sparsest case, a few nodes hosting large subtrees are observed.
The emergence of large subtrees can be averted by careful
node and anchor placement. The distributions of hop-counts
in the three densest scenarios are similar to those observed in
the fixed-area scenario set. However, in the sparsest scenario a
majority of nodes are two hops from an anchor, rather than
one hop. This increases latency; thus, it is best to have short
paths from SNs to their corresponding AN.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed LASeR, a secure onboarding
and routing framework for NDN-based IoT networks. Scalabil-
ity is achieved through a hierarchical network design, and very
little cryptographic or computational burden. Evaluation by
simulations confirmed that LASeR requires minimal network
overhead and achieves acceptable onboarding convergence
times.
The current implementation of LASeR routes based on
node IDs, however an extension is planned to support the
advertisement of arbitrary name prefixes. A mechanism to
address node mobility with low overhead is also in development.
After further validating LASeR in ndnSIM, we intend to
implement it on real IoT devices for a live testbed deployment.
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